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Case C-189/01, H. Jippes, Afdeling Groningen van de Nederlandse
Vereniging tot Bescherming van Dieren, Afdeling Assen en omstreken van de
Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Dieren v. Minister van
Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, Judgment of the Full Court of 12 July
2001, nyr.
1. Introduction
The economic and practical disruption brought about by the foot and mouth
disease is only too well known to residents of a number of Member States:
the limitations imposed not only on farmers but also on the movement of
ordinary citizens as well as non-farming animals, led to serious economic
consequences. Although a vaccine is available for the disease, the Com-
munity has a non-vaccination policy: vaccination is prohibited because it
does not allow the eradication of the disease. This is because once an animal
has been vaccinated, it is not possible to detect whether it is a carrier of
the virus, which spreads extremely easily. Further, (non-European) foot and
mouth-free countries may refuse to import meat from countries which allow
vaccination in fear that the undetectable virus might enter their territory. In
order to avoid the disease from spreading, a non-vaccination policy has to be
accompanied by the mandatory killing of the infected animals. Ms Jippes and
two animal protection associations attacked the Community policy arguing
that by privileging mandatory killing over vaccination, it did not take into
sufficient account animal welfare. The case was the first decided under the
new accelerated procedure which, in cases of exceptional urgency, allows
for a derogation from the ordinary rules of procedure.1 From a substantive
viewpoint the case raises interesting questions, which deserved the attention
of the full Court, in relation to the Community’s standpoint on animal wel-
fare, namely whether animal welfare can be considered a general principle of
Community law.
1. The CFI has used the expedited procedure in Joined Cases T-195/01 & T-207/01,
Gibraltar v. Commission, ruling of 30 April 2002, nyr.
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2. Factual background
Ms Jippes owned four sheep and two goats as pet animals. Worried about the
possibility that her animals might be infected by the foot and mouth disease
which would, under Community rules, result in their mandatory killing, Ms
Jippes applied to the Minister for Agriculture seeking an exemption from
the prohibition on vaccination. According to Community rules vaccination is
prohibited subject to derogations in case of “emergency vaccination”.2 The
introduction of emergency vaccination is decided by the Commission in col-
laboration with the Member State concerned, or by the Member State follow-
ing notification to the Commission, provided that basic Community interests
are not endangered. Emergency vaccination can take the form of suppressive
vaccination, carried out exclusively in conjunction with pre-emptive killing;
or protective vaccination which explicitly excludes pre-emptive killing. The
Commission authorized the competent Dutch authorities to have recourse to
emergency vaccination (both suppressive and protective) and laid down the
conditions and territory in which such vaccination could take place.3 Since
Ms Jippes resided outside the vaccination zone her request to vaccinate her
pets was dismissed by the Minister. Appealing against the Minister’s decision,
Ms Jippes and two animal protection associations attacked the vaccination
ban imposed by Community law on two grounds. First, they argued that it was
incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Animals
kept for Farming Purposes, to which the Community is party, which provides
that housing, food, water and care should be appropriate to the animals’
physiological and ethological needs (hereinafter the Convention).4 Secondly,
the applicants contended that the ban was incompatible with a general prin-
ciple of Community law allegedly requiring “all appropriate measures to be
taken in order to ensure animal welfare and to guarantee that animals are not
unnecessarily exposed to pain and suffering and that no unnecessary harm
is done to them”.5 The national court also enquired as to the proportional-
2. Council Directive 85/511/EEC introducing Community measures for the control of
foot-and-mouth disease, O.J. 1985, L 315/11, amended by Council Directive 90/423/EEC,
O.J. 1990, L 224/13. The latter introduced the non-vaccination policy.
3. Commission Decision 2001/279/EC amending Decision 2001/246/EC laying down the
conditions for the control and eradication of foot-and-mouth disease in the Netherlands in
application of Art. 13 of Directive 85/511/EEC, O.J. 2001, L 96/19.
4. European Convention for the protection of animals kept for farming purposes adopted
within the framework of the Council of Europe, O.J. 1978, L 323/14, ratified by the Com-
munity pursuant to Council Decision 78/923/EEC concerning the conclusion of the European
Convention for the protection of animals kept for farming purposes, O.J. 1978, L 323/12, Art.
3 (now Art. 3a following the amendments introduced by the Protocol of amendment to the
European Convention for the Protection of Animals kept for farming purposes, O.J. 1992, L
395/22).
5. Para 36 of the judgment.
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ity of the vaccination ban and of the Commission’s decisions authorizing
vaccination in selected zones only. Further, having regard to the number of
outbreaks of the disease and its rapidity in spreading, as well as the serious
consequences deriving from it, the national court considered the matter to be
one of exceptional urgency and requested that the new accelerated procedure
be used.
3. Judgment of the Court
The Court accepted the national court’s request and dealt with the case by
means of the new accelerated procedure which in cases of exceptional urgency
allows the President of the Court to derogate from the ordinary rules of
procedure in order to ensure a prompt ruling.
As for the merits of the case, the Court rejected the applicants’ contention
that animal welfare be considered a general principle of Community law. In
order to support their claim, the applicants relied on several arguments. First,
they argued that the principle that animals should not be exposed to pain or
suffering and that their health and welfare must not be impaired is part of the
“collective legal consciousness”. Further, they submitted that such principle
could be inferred from the intention expressed by the Member States and the
Community in ratifying the Convention as well as in adopting Community
secondary legislation for the protection of animals. Lastly they relied on
Protocol 24 to the Amsterdam Treaty which states that “[i]n formulating
and implementing the Community’s agriculture, transport, internal market
and research policies, the Community and the Member States shall pay full
regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative
or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in
particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage”. The
applicants pointed out that according to Article 311 EC, the Protocol forms
an integral part of Community law with which the Directive in question had
to comply.
The applicants also stressed that the fact that the principle of animal welfare
is not mentioned amongst the objectives of the Community or of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), is not conclusive given that numerous principles of
Community law have been recognized by the Court despite the fact that they
are not listed as Community objectives. The Commission and the intervening
Member States (the Netherlands, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Finland) all opposed
the applicants’ request for reasons very much reflected in the Court’s ruling.
The Court adopted a textual approach to conclude that animal welfare pro-
tection does not form part of the general principles of Community law. Thus
animal welfare is not mentioned as one of the Treaty or CAP objectives;
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the Council’s decision which ratified the Convention expressly states that
animal protection is not itself one of the objectives of the Community; the
wording of the Protocol, which is limited only to four fields of Community
activity and provides for exceptions, makes it apparent that “it does not lay
down any general principle of Community law which is binding on the Com-
munity institutions”;6 the Convention does not impose any clear, precisely
defined and unqualified obligation; there is no indication in the case law that
the Court has accepted any plea of justification based on the protection of
animals derogation contained in Article 30;7 and, although the secondary
legislation refers to it, there is no indication therein of the fact that animal
welfare protection should be considered a general principle of Community
law.
This notwithstanding, the Court did not deny some importance being
attached to the protection of animals and their health. In the Court’s view, this
is a requirement of public interest reinforced by the Protocol, the fulfilment
of which can be verified in the context of the proportionality (the relevant
general principle) of the measure. Thus the Court found it necessary to verify
that the Community had taken full account of the requirements of animal
welfare in adopting the contested measures.8
Consistently with its previous case law on the CAP, the Court applied the
test of “manifest inappropriateness” in order to assess the proportionality
of the measures: in areas in which the Community enjoys a wide margin
of discretion the Court refuses to substitute its judgment for that of the
6. On the legal value of the Protocol see Cramm and Bowles, “Animal welfare and the
Treaty of Rome – A legal analysis of the Protocol on animal welfare and welfare standards in the
European Union” 12 JEL (2000), 197–205. For an account of the background to the adoption
of the Protocol, see Wilkins (Ed.), Animal Welfare in Europe (Kluwer Law International,
1997), chap. 6.
7. Para 75 of the ruling states “Similarly, Article 30 EC refers to the ’life of ... animals
only by way of exception to the prohibition of measures having equivalent effect, and there is
nothing in the Court’s case law to indicate that the Court has accepted any plea of justification
based on that provision” (emphasis added). This paragraph is particularly obscure (the French
and Italian versions are worded in a comparable way). To the author’s knowledge the Court has
accepted the protection of animals’ justification on several occasions; for recent examples see
Case C-67/97, D Bluhme, [1998] ECR I-8033, and Case C-350/97, W Monsees v. Unabha¨ngiger
Verwaltungssenat fu¨r Ka¨rnten, [1999] ECR I-2921 in which the Court found that in principle the
Member State could rely on that justification for the period preceding harmonizing legislation,
but it then found the rules not proportionate. Further, it would be peculiar for the Court to
exclude one of the derogations expressly mentioned by the Treaty. It is to be wondered whether
this paragraph is not an example of a side effect (inaccurate drafting) of the accelerated
procedure.
8. The wording seems stronger than that used in Case 131/86, United Kingdom v. Council,
[1988] ECR 905, where the Court stated that the protection of animals must be taken into
account by the Community institutions when exercising their powers (para 17).
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institutions.9 Further, the Court restated the principle according to which the
legality of an act does not depend on a retrospective assessment of its efficacy.
The Court then found that both the Directive and the Commission’s decisions
were not dis-proportionate. As to the plea that the decisions breached the
principle of equal treatment since animals in the fire break zone and animals
in zoos could take advantage of preventive vaccination whilst animals located
elsewhere could not, the Court found that the situations were not comparable
and that, even had they been, the Commission’s measures were objectively
justified.
4. Analysis
The issue of animal protection has arisen on several occasions, mainly as a
possible ground of derogation from Article 28,10 as well as a public interest
ground to be taken into account in the exercise of discretion in agriculture
cases.11 The case at issue however raised for the first time the problem of
whether animal welfare is to be considered one of the general principles of
Community law.
The Court rejected the applicants’ contention that animal welfare should
be so considered, finding instead that animal welfare is “merely” a public
interest to be taken into account by the institutions when exercising their
regulatory power. The ruling is consistent with the sources and functions of
the general principles and with the Community’s standpoint on animal welfare
as highlighted by Community secondary legislation. We will first examine
the difference between a general principle and a public interest, and then look
at the defining characteristics of general principles. We will then conclude
that the Court’s ruling reflects the dominant minimalist approach which sees
the protection of animals from unnecessary suffering as an aspect of public
morality.
In judicial review cases, general principles of Community law are the
yardstick against which the legality of measures adopted within the field
of Community law is to be measured.12 In the case annotated here, the
9. See Case C-331/88, Fedesa and others, [1990] ECR I-4023, para 21.
10. See e.g. Cases C-5/94, The Queen v. MAFF, ex parte Hedley Lomas Ltd [1996] ECR
I-2553; C-162/97, Gunnar Nilsson, Per Olov Hagelgen, Solweig Arrborn [1998] ECR I-7477;
Monsees and Bluhme, both cited supra note 7.
11. For recent examples see the many cases relating to the limitations imposed in order to
deal with the BSE crisis: Case C-507/99, Denkavit Nederland BV v. Minister van Landbouw,
Natuurbeheer en Visserij, Voedselvoorzieningsin- en verkoopbureau, Judgment of 8 Jan. 2002,
nyr; C-180/96, UK v. Commission, [1998] ECR I-2265.
12. General principles bind all the institutions, Court included. Thus the Treaties must be
interpreted in the light of general principles; Toth, “Human rights as general principles of
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relevant general principle was that of proportionality, not animal welfare.
Proportionality as a general principle means that the legislature has to consider
conflicting interests when legislating; the degree of review will then depend
on the margin of discretion enjoyed by the institution adopting the measure.13
In this case, the Court recognized that animal welfare is one of the conflicting
interests which have to be taken into account when exercising a discretion.
But in policy-drafting, the institutions enjoy a broad margin of discretion and
a rule is only struck down when manifestly inappropriate.14
On the other hand, when assessing the legality of a measure in relation to
more specific general principles,15 such as fundamental rights, proportion-
ality becomes relevant for an investigation as to how the balance between
competing interests has been struck, i.e. whether the limitation of a legally
protected right is justified having regard to the pursued aim.
The difference is one of degree since in the latter case the Court’s scrutiny
is more “invasive”; it is however also conceptual. When the institution is
weighing public interests, it is making policy choices. Provided that it has
taken all relevant interests into account, and that the choice is not manifestly
inappropriate, the Court is not going to interfere with the institution’s dis-
cretion. In this context, scrutiny over the proportionality of the measure is
closer to a test of unreasonableness than to proportionality-proper. On the
other hand, when the measure affects a legally recognized right (or interest),
the scrutiny of the Court goes further and the assessment of proportionality
involves a substantial review on how the balance between the individual right
and the public interest has been struck.16 This is because “the protection for
certain recognized interests – generally those such as traditionally protec-
law, in the past and in the future” in Bernitz and Nergelius (Eds.), General Principles of
Community Law (Kluwer International, 2000), pp. 73–92 and Hartley, The Foundations of
European Community Law (4th ed., OUP, 1998), chap. 5, consider the general principle as
being a source of law hierarchally superior even to the Treaties.
13. For a comprehensive study on the different ways in which the principle of proportion-
ality is applied in Community law see De Burca, “The principle of proportionality and its
application in EC law” 13 YEL (1993), 105–150 and “Proportionality and Subsidiarity as
General Principles of Law” in Bernitz and Nergelius (Eds.), op. cit. supra note 12, 95–111. For
comparative studies see Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law (Kluwer
Law International, 1996); and Ellis (Ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of
Europe (Hart, 1999).
14. The situation is similar to cases in which judicial review is sought on the grounds that
a measure conflicts with environmental protection objectives. Also in those cases the test for
review is one of “manifest error” of appraisal. See Case C-341/95, Gianni Bettati v. Safety
Hi-Tech Srl, [1998] ECR I-4355, and Case C-284/95, Safety Hi-Tech Srl v. S. & T. Srl, [1998]
ECR I-4301.
15. The Court has recognized as general principles: fundamental rights, legal certainty and
protection of legitimate expectations, effective remedies and equality.
16. For an interesting discussion on the differing degrees of review according to the subject
matter see Regina (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 A.C. 532.
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ted civil liberties and human rights, and other legally acknowledged values
and interests – is generally recognized as a judicial task”.17 The inclusion
of an interest amongst the general principles of Community law somehow
transforms it into a legally recognized interest: it takes it from the realm of
“politics”, i.e. choice between competing public interests, to the realm of leg-
ally protected “interests” upon which the Court can legitimately adjudicate.
An example might be useful to clarify the distinction between a public
interest and a general principle. Consider scientific research: in drafting legis-
lation regulating the use of animals for scientific purposes the institutions have
to take into account animal welfare: thus they might impose limitations on
scientific research in order to avoid unnecessary animal suffering. If however
animal welfare were to be recognized as a general principle of Community
law, a scrutiny as to whether the benefits arising from the use of animals
justify the violation of their welfare would be necessary. It is not obvious
that the extensive use of animals, especially in cases relating to cosmetic
research, could be thus justified. Consider other examples: intensive farming
when there is no immediate need for mass meat consumption, or the cruel
treatment of geese for the production of foie gras. These are only the most
obvious examples of cases which would raise considerable problems were
animal welfare to be considered as a general principle of Community law.
It is hardly surprising then that the Court avoided venturing on such a diffi-
cult path: choices such as the degree of protection which should be afforded
to animals, and indeed their legal status, are better left in the hands of the
Community legislature.
Moreover, the ruling of the Court is hermeneutically consistent with the
(accepted) sources and functions of the general principles. General principles,
whether in a national or international context, are mainly interpretative tools
developed by the courts in order to effectively perform their adjudicative
function.18 They reflect the values inherent in the system of reference. In the
Community context the ECJ had to develop a substantial body of general
principles not only as an aid to interpretation, but also in order to fill the gaps
arising from the sectoral and non-comprehensive nature of the Treaties.19
17. De Burca, op. cit. supra note 13, 105–150, at 107, emphasis added.
18. For a comparative study on General Principles see Koopmans, “General principles of law
in European and national systems of law: A comparative view” in Bernitz and Nergelius (Eds.),
op. cit. supra note 12, 25–34; for a more theoretical approach see Wiklund and Bengoetxea
“General constitutional principles of Community law”, ibid., 119–142, esp. 121–122; for a
study of the way the general principles of Community law are applied by French and English
courts see Boyron, “General principles of law and national courts: Applying a Jus Commune”,
23 ELRev (1998), 171–178.
19. On the development of the general principles see Herdegen, “The origins and develop-
ment of the general principles of Community law” in Bernitz and Nergelius (Eds.), op. cit.
supra note 12, 3–23; Rodriguez Iglesias, “Reflections on the general principles of Community
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Thus, the Court found that there are “inherent” limits to the regulatory and
executive powers of the Community institutions. In order to identify these
limits, the Court drew mainly from the common constitutional traditions to
the Member States; this is not to say that a general principle needs to be
reflected in all the Member States’ constitutional traditions.20 The general
principles however undeniably reflect the values inherent in contemporary
liberal democracies. Tridimas has thus identified as one of the characteristics
of the general principles the fact that they derive from the rule of law and
refer “primarily to the individual and the public authorities”.21
The contention that animal welfare be considered as one of the general prin-
ciples of Community law needs then to be assessed against this background.
The level of protection afforded to animals varies considerably across the
Community and there seem not to be any consensus yet on the fact that anim-
als might have some autonomous rights.22 Further, the principle of animal
welfare is not part of our common constitutional tradition; rather it seems that
the principle of animal welfare more properly rests on public morality, i.e.
on the idea – this shared across the Community – that unnecessary cruelty
must be avoided, with different Member States having different views of
when animal suffering can be deemed necessary.23 At Community level this
law”, 1 CYELS (1998), 1–16; see also Arnull, The General Principles of Community Law
and the Individual (Leicester University Press, 1990); Hartley, op. cit. supra note 12, chap. 5;
Tridimas, The General Principles of EC law (OUP, 1999).
20. The principle of proportionality, for instance, derives mainly from the German legal
tradition, and was absent in the British Constitutional tradition. Other sources of general
principles are Treaty provisions and International law. The textual justification for the Court’s
elaboration of the general principles can be found in Art. 220 EC which provides that the ECJ
“shall ensure that in the application and interpretation of this Treaty the law is observed”.
21. Tridimas, op. cit. supra note 19, p. 3.
22. The contention that animals might be right-holders whose rights – like those of children
– can be exercised only vicariously has been made by leading philosophers on animal rights
and seems to have recently been endorsed by the German Bundestag which has passed an
amendment to extend the protection afforded by the Constitution to animals (reported in The
Guardian, 18 May 2002, p. 2). It can be argued that if animals were to be considered as
right-holders, then the Court could have legitimately included animal welfare amongst the
general principles of Community law since to do so would have been consistent with the idea
that general principles are a means to protect rights when there is a legal vacuum. However,
for the time being there is no consensus in the Community as to the legal status of animals.
On animal rights see especially Singer, Animal Liberation (2nd ed., Pimlico, 1995); and also
Practical Ethics (CUP, 1979), esp. chap. 3; Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1983); and Defending Animal Rights (University of Illinois Press, 2001). For
an overview of the main philosophical positions in relation to animals see Gruen, “Animals”
in Singer (Ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, 1991); for a
historical anthology of philosophers’ views on animals see Regan, Singer and Cliffs (Eds.),
Animal Rights and Human Obligations (Prentice Hall, 1976).
23. The view that the protection of animals from unnecessary cruelty is justified on public
morality grounds was endorsed in England in In Re Wedgwood, [1915] Ch 113, CA. In case
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is reflected in the body of legislation which aims at minimizing, rather than
eliminating, animal suffering: thus slaughtering must be “humane”;24 anim-
al testing for cosmetic products should be eliminated as soon as feasible;25
scientific research has to be regulated so as to minimize animal suffering;26
minimum standards must be respected when transporting animals,27
and so on.28
The Court’s finding that animal welfare is not a principle of Community
law, but rather a public interest to be taken into account reflects then both the
common constitutional traditions of the Member States, and the Community’s
position as emerging from the regulatory instruments that deal with the issue.
C-1/96, The Queen v. MAFF, ex parte Compassion in World Farming Limited, [1998] ECR
I-1251, CIWF attempted to rely on the public morality derogation to attack the Minister’s
refusal to restrict the export of veal calves to Member States which afforded a lesser degree
of protection to animals; the Court however did not examine the issue since it found that
secondary legislation pre-empted Member States from relying on Art. 30. For a philosophical
articulation of this view see also Kant, “Duties to Animals and Spirits” in Lecture on Ethics
(CUP, 1997) and in Regan, Singer and Cliffs (Eds.), op. cit. supra note 22, at 122–123.
24. Council Directive 93/119/EC on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or
killing, O.J. 1993, L 340/21.
25. Council Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to cosmetic products, O.J. 1976, L 262/169, as amended inter alia by Council Directive
93/35/EEC, O.J. 1993, L 151/32 (the consolidated version of the Directive is available at
europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/consleg/pdf/19-76/en 1976L0768 do 001.pdf). The Directive fixes a
date for a prohibition on the marketing of cosmetic containing ingredients tested on animals;
the deadline can be postponed in case insufficient progress has been made in developing
alternative testing methods to replace animal testing. The deadline has been already extended
twice; see Commission Directive 2000/41/EC postponing for a second time the date after
which animal tests are prohibited for ingredients or combinations of ingredients of cosmetic
products, O.J. 2000, L 145/25.
26. Council Decision 1999/575/EC concerning the conclusion by the Community of the
European Convention for the protection of vertebrate animals used for experimental and other
scientific purposes, O.J. 1999, L 222/29.
27. Council Directive 91/628/EEC on the protection of animals during transport, O.J. 1991,
L 340/17. For a critical assessment of the Directive see Brooman and Legge, “Animal Trans-
portation”, (1995) NLJ, 1131–1133.
28. For a comprehensive account of Community legislation on animal welfare see Wilkins,
Animal Welfare in Europe (Kluwer Law International, 1997). See also Council Regulation
3254/91/EEC prohibiting the use of leghold traps in the Community and the introduction into
the Community of pelts and manufactured goods of certain wild animal species originating in
countries which catch them by means of leghold traps or trapping methods which do not meet
international humane trapping standards, O.J. 1991, L 308/1. The adoption of this Regulation,
which provides for a ban on imports of pelts of given species unless the country of origin
has banned leghold traps or complies with internationally agreed human trapping standards
led to a controversy with the USA and Canada in the context of the WTO; see Harrop, “The
international regulation of animal welfare and conservation issues through standards dealing
with the trapping of wild mammals”, 12 JEL (2000), 333–360.
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5. The accelerated procedure
The debate on the administration of justice at Community level has been very
lively in recent years and there is no doubt that the overload of the Community
courts, with its consequences on the average length of proceedings, is one
of the main causes of concern. The situation is felt to be so serious that
during the last Intergovernmental Conference, the President of the Court in
a letter to the Financial Times broke the institution’s traditional silence and
launched a forceful “cry” for help to the Member States.29 The need to afford
the European courts with the means to rule more promptly when necessary
was also set out in the Due Report on the future of the judicial system of the
European Union. Thus the Report recommended that the Rules of Procedure
be reformed so as to provide for an accelerated procedure to be used in cases
of exceptional urgency. The matter was felt to be so pressing that it could not
await the Treaty amendments;30 during the year 2000 the Rules of Procedure
of the Court were amended accordingly and the possibility to have recourse
to accelerated procedures was established for cases arising from references
from national courts,31 as well as for direct proceedings in front of the CFI
and ECJ (expedited procedure).32
In the case of references for a preliminary ruling, the President of the ECJ,
at the request of the national court, may exceptionally decide to apply an
accelerated procedure which derogates from the ordinary rules of procedure.33
Thus, the President may immediately fix the day for the hearing, whilst
normally the date for the hearing is fixed only after the written procedure and,
where applicable, the preparatory inquiries have been carried out. After the
date has been fixed the parties may lodge statements and written observations
within a period fixed by the President which cannot be less than 15 days.
Further, the President may ask the parties to limit their observations to the
essential points of law raised by the question referred. The Court then rules
after hearing the Advocate General.
29. Financial Times, 18 April 2000, p. 23. See also “The EC Court of Justice and
the Institutional Reform of the European Union” (April 2000), available on www.curia.
eu.int/en/txts/intergov/rod.pdf
30. The future of the judicial system of the European Union (Proposals and Reflections),
available on the Court’s website at www.curia.eu.int/e-n/txts/intergov/ave.pdf, p. 10 and ss. On
the Nice Treaty amendments see Johnston, “Judicial reform and the Treaty of Nice”, 38 CML
Rev. (2001), 499–523.
31. Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 16 May 2000, O.J.
2000, L 122/43.
32. Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 28 Nov. 2000, O.J.
2000, L 322/1 and Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, O.J.
2000, L 322/4. The amendments have introduced a new article 62a and 76a of the respective
Rules of Procedure.
33. Art. 104a of the Rules of Procedure.
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The accelerated procedure leaves a desirable margin of discretion to the
President as to which rules to derogate from, ensuring the flexibility necessary
to tailor the procedure to the actual needs of the case whilst also allowing
the possibility of delivering a prompt ruling. In the case at issue the hearing
took place less than two months after the application was lodged (usually the
first hearing is approximately one year after the application), and the case
was decided less than a month after the hearing. Compared with the time it
usually takes for a ruling (21 months in 2000),34 this is quite extraordinary; the
accelerated procedure will be an essential tool to afford effective protection
to persons’ rights, and indeed one of the concerns expressed in the Due report
was the prospect of unduly long proceedings in cases relating to visas, asylum
and immigration policies (Title IV). Although so far the European Court of
Human Rights has not taken into account the time needed for a preliminary
ruling in calculating the length of domestic proceedings to assess a possible
violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, it could
decide to follow a different approach when the delay directly affects personal
freedom.35
These are the obvious advantages of the new procedure; however there
is also a considerable flaw: the Opinion of the Advocate General is not
published and the report for the hearing, usually obtainable on request, is
also not available. It is to be expected that the procedure will not be used in
acte claire type of cases, since in those cases the Court has now the power
to make an order,36 but will rather be used in cases in which new, if not
fundamental, points are raised. Not to make the Opinion available to the
public (it is not even available on request) seems then an unjustified failure
in transparency. Reasons of expedition do not provide a plausible excuse:
if the Court can deliver a ruling in less than a month so can the Advocate
General. Delays relating to translation problems do not justify the fact that the
Opinion is never to be rendered public. Given the importance of the Advocate
General’s Opinion for following and understand the Court’s reasoning it is
thus to be hoped that this serious flaw will be remedied as soon as possible.
Since the Rules of Procedure leave considerable discretion to the President
as to the rules which can be derogated from, it seems that in future cases
the publication of the Advocate General’s opinion might be decided without
further amendment of the Rules of Procedure.
34. See Annual Report of the Court of Justice of the European Communities for 2000,
available on the Court’s website at www.curia.eu.int/en/stat/st00cr.pdf
35. Pafitis and others v. Greece, (1999) 27 EHRR 566. See also Case C-185/95 P, Baustahl-
gewebe GmbH v. Commission, [1998] ECR I-8417, in which the ECJ accepted that proceedings
in front of the European courts are not to be excessively delayed; it then found that five and a
half years for proceedings before the CFI was an excessive length of time.
36. Art. 104 (3) of the Rules of Procedure.
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6. Conclusions
The case at issue raised important points not only as to the standpoint of the
Community on animal welfare but also as to the distinction between general
principles and Community’s public interests which have to be taken into
account when exercising a regulatory function.
As for the former, the Court seems to have embraced the minimalist view
which sees animal welfare as part of public morality, thus rejecting (for
the time being) the idea that animals might have autonomous rights. As to
the latter point, the ruling is consistent with the recognized function and
sources of the general principles; the Court safeguards the very primacy of
the general principles as well as the idea that a general principle must reflect
common constitutional traditions. Further the Court is far from disregarding
the changes which have occurred in our perception of animal welfare: animal
welfare is a public interest which the institutions have to take into account
when exercising their discretion.
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